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THE MINORITY-PREFERRED CANDIDATE IN
THORNBURG v. GINGLES: AN ARGUMENT FOR
COLOR-BLIND VOTING
LARRYJ.H. Liu*
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of par-
ties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority
of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists,
it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their
own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
- James Madison'
By making black the color of preference, these mandates
have reburdened society with the very marriage of color
and preference (in reverse) that we set out to eradicate.
The old sin is reaffirmed in a new guise.
- Shelby Steele
2
INTRODUCTION
As amended in 1982, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 3 pro-
hibits electoral practices that effectively deny minority group
members the equal opportunity "to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."4 In Thorn-
* B.A., 1991, University of California, Berkeley;J.D., 1994, Notre Dame
Law School; Thos. J. White Scholar 1992-1994. I wish to thank Professor John
Robinson for his constructive comments, Bob Badger and Kathleen Collins for
their late-night editing, and my mother, Joanna Kuo, for her unwavering
support.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
2. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARAcrER 115
(1990) (discussing the effects of affirmative action).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 2, as amended in 1982, provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 1973b(f) (2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
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burg v. Gingles,5 the Supreme Court attempted to establish the
standard for finding a voting rights violation under section 2.
The Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a vio-
lation of section 2 exists because of vote dilution. First, the plain-
tiff must show that the minority group is sufficiently large and
compact to make up a majority in a single-member district. Sec-
ond, the plaintiff must show that the minority group is politically
cohesive. And third, the plaintiff must show that the majority
group votes as a bloc to defeat the minority's candidate. To
apply its test, the Court needed to define the "representative[ ] of
... choice",' or what the Court called "the minority's preferred
candidate."7 The Court failed, however, to agree upon a single,
coherent definition of this minority-preferred candidate. As a
result, since 1986 when the Court announced its decision in Gin-
gles, the circuit courts have reached independent and contradic-
tory conclusions in identifying the minority-preferred candidate.8
The Gingles analysis continues to play an important role in
civil rights litigation and promises to remain at the center of the
voting rights debate. As it was amended in 1982, section 2 repre-
sented a response to vote-dilution claims in multimember dis-
tricts, and at the time, most voting rights litigation, including
Gingles, involved multimember, vote-dilution claims. Recent
developments in voting rights litigation, however, show a shift in
focus from vote-dilution claims in multimember districts to vote-
fragmentation claims in single-member districts. The Gingles
Court explicitly declined to decide whether its analysis applied to
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id. Section 1973b(f) (2) provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political sub-
division to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote because he is a member of a language minority.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1988).
5. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
7. 478 U.S. at 51.
8. See infra part II.D.
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single-member districts.9 Recently, in Growe v. Emison,' ° the
Court finally concluded that Gingles does apply to vote-fragmen-
tation claims in single-member district.'
The question of who may be considered a minority-pre-
ferred candidate, or more specifically, the question of whether a
candidate who is not a member of a particular minority group
may (validly) be considered the minority-preferred candidate for
that group, remains significant, especially since it has divided the
circuit courts. This question itself is important because the
answer dictates which elections may be examined under part
three of the Gingles test. Finally, the question and its answer also
involve the public's participation in and understanding of repre-
sentative democracy in America.
This Note attempts to present an understanding of the
minority-preferred candidate that is consistent with legislative
history, flexible and therefore functional in actual application,
and compatible with democratic political theory. Section I pro-
vides a brief history of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982.
Section II examines the different opinions in Gingles written by
Justices Brennan, White, and O'Connor and the splintered direc-
tions taken by various circuit courts since Gingles over the minor-
ity-preferred candidate. This section also explains the significant
role played by the concept of a minority-preferred candidate in
finding voting rights violations. Section III argues that the
appropriate method of determining the minority-preferred can-
didate combines the position adopted by the Tenth Circuit with
factors listed in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982
amendment to section 2 and that this method is consistent with
legislative intent while responding to the concerns expressed by
the Fifth Circuit. Section IV concludes that this amalgam of the
Tenth Circuit and legislative factors is consistent with both an
original understanding of and the underlying principles behind
representative democracy in America.
9. 478 U.S. at 46-47 n.12.
10. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
11. 113 S. Ct. at 1084. For a brief discussion of the issues involved in
applying Gingles to single-member districts, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 488-89 (1993), and
BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QuEST FOR
VOTING EQUALrTY 15-17 (1992).
1994]
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I. HISTORY OF SECTION 2
In 1982, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to address the problem of minority vote dilution.' 2 The
amendment resulted from congressional reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 3 In Bolden,
the Supreme Court had greatly increased the burden on plain-
tiffs who challenged electoral practices under the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments by requiring them to prove that discrimi-
natory intent had motivated the adoption of the challenged prac-
tices. Prior to Bolden, the standard for evaluating voting rights
violations had been the "totality of the circumstances" analysis
formulated by the Court in White v. Regester.14 With the 1982
amendment, Congress intended to replace the intent-based test
articulated in Bolden with the "totality of the circumstances" anal-
ysis previously set forth in White. 5
12. Chandler Davidson provides this definition of minority vote dilution:
Ethnic or racial minority vote dilution may be defined as a
process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert,
combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable majority
group to diminish or cancel the voting strength of at least one
minority group. Thus conceived, it is a form of discrimination distinct
from disfranchisement and candidate diminution. In its most easily
recognizable forms - gerrymandering and multimember election
systems - it was an important tool used by whites in the South both
during and after Reconstruction to diminish the political strength of
newly enfranchised blacks.
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CoNTROVERsIFs IN
MINORITY VOTING 7, 24 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
13. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
14. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
15. According to the Senate Report:
In Bolden, a plurality of the Supreme Court broke with precedent
and substantially increased the burden on plaintiffs in voting
discrimination cases by requiring proof of discriminatory purpose.
The committee has concluded that this intent test places an
unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs. It diverts the judicial
inquiry from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal
access to the electoral process to a historical question of individual
motives.
In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a
prerequisite to establishing a violation of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Therefore, the committee has amended section 2 to
permit plaintiffs to prove violations by showing that minority voters
were denied an equal chance to participate in the political process,
i.e., by meeting the pre-Bolden results test.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193.
In discussing voter dilution cases before Bolden, the Senate Report states:
The White decision did not analyze the motivation of the legislators.
There was no discussion of the purpose behind the challenged system,
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A. Early Standard: White and Zimmer
In White, the Supreme Court held a multimember voting dis-
trict unconstitutional because it was "used invidiously to cancel
out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups." 6 The
Court agreed with the district court's judgment ordering the dis-
establishment of multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar
Counties, Texas. To succeed in a claim that a specific electoral
practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court stated that
[tihe plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support
findings that the political processes leading to nomination
and election were not equally open to participation by the
group in question - that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.' 7
Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain what evidence would
support such findings.18 The Court did note the history of racial
discrimination in Texas, the low number of minority representa-
tives who had served on the Texas Legislature from the two coun-
ties in question, and the use of racial campaign tactics in recent
elections, as well as other facts, but the Court failed to provide
any meaningful guidance in evaluating these facts.19 The White
opinion merely affirmed the district court's "ultimate assess-
ment" which was based upon the "totality of the
circumstances."20
The seminal opinion by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McK-
eithen2W ' attempted to find some order in the White decision. In
considering claims of vote dilution from the at-large electoral
practices of a Louisiana school board and police jury, the Zimmer
court stated that
where a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the
process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legis-
lators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state pol-
icy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
and no finding as of discriminatory intent. The focus was on actual
result of the legislation 'based on the totality of the circumstances.'"
Id at 198-99.
16. 412 U.S. at 765.
17. Id. at 766.
18. The decision in White has been criticized for the lack of guidance it
provided. See generally Davidson, supra note 12, at 32-34.
19. 412 U.S. at 766-69.
20. Id. at 769.
21. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East Carrol Parish School
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
1994l
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districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in
general precludes the effective participation in the elec-
tion system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced
by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority
vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and
the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from
particular geographical subdistricts. 22
The Zimmer court continued that vote dilution could be estab-
lished "upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these fac-
tors," although "all these factors need not be proved in order to
obtain relief."23 The standard which eventually evolved from
White with the refinements of Zimmer was known as the Zimmer
test or the "totality of the circumstances doctrine."24 It provided
the standard in voting rights jurisprudence until the Supreme
Court decision in Bolden.
B. City of Mobile v. Bolden
The Supreme Court, in City of Mobile v. Bolden,25 rejected the
evidentiary standard stated in Zimmer.26 In a plurality opinion
written by Justice Stewart,2 7 four of the Justices agreed that they
22. 485 F.2d at 1305.
23. Id.
24. BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST
FOR VOTING EQUAliTY 34 (1992).
In criticizing the "totality of the circumstances" test, Samuel Issacharoff
asserts that
neither White nor Zimmer could identify the operational mechanism
for the unconstitutional dilution of minority voting strength .... The
White/Zimmer "totality of the circumstances" test was static; its aim was
to uncover the dynamic working of electoral systems, but it had no way
to measure the operational features of challenged electoral practices.
Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1844-45 (1992).
25. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See generally GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 34-
38 (providing short, detailed discussion of Bolden); Frank R. Parker, The
"Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69
VA. L REv. 715, 729-46 (1983) (providing discussion and critique of Bolden).
26. According to Justice Stewart, Zimmer "was quite evidently decided
upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory
purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause - that proof
of a discriminatory effect is sufficient." 446 U.S. at 71.
27. A divided Court in Bolden produced six separate opinions. Justice
Stewart wrote the plurality opinion. Justice Stewart was joined by ChiefJustice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the result, and Justice
Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall each filed separate dissenting
opinions.
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would require plaintiffs to show that a discriminatory purpose
motivated the adoption of the challenged electoral practice in
order to find vote dilution unconstitutional. According to Stew-
art, "[w] e have recognized, however, that such legislative appor-
tionments could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their
purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities."2" He then added that
"only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."29
The plaintiffs in Bolden claimed that the at-large system then
in place in Mobile, Alabama, violated the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.3"
The plaintiffs represented black voters in Mobile, and they
argued that the city had violated their voting rights by using an
at-large system of municipal elections which diluted the voting
strength of black voters.3 In his opinion, Justice Stewart began
by dismissing the section 2 claim. According to Stewart: "it is
apparent that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon
that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse legislative his-
tory of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself."32 As he
understood earlier decisions by the Court, the Fifteenth Amend-
ment protected only the "freedom to vote" or access to the
polls.3" Therefore, because black voters in Mobile could "regis-
ter and vote without hindrance," Stewart declined to find a viola-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment and, consequently, section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.34
Justice Stewart then went on to consider the Fourteenth
Amendment claim. The fundamental question was whether dis-
criminatory intent must be shown in order to find a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Stewart argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment required such a showing:
We have recognized, however, that such legislative appor-
tionments [as multimember districts] could violate that
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously
to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or
28. 446 U.S. at 66.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 58.
31. Id. The plaintiffs had won in district court and in appellate court.
423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976), affd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. 446 U.S. at 60-61.
33. Id. at 64.
34. Id. at 65.
1994]
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ethnic minorities. To prove such a purpose it is not
enough to show that the group allegedly discriminated
against has not elected representatives in proportion to it
numbers. A plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was
.conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic [e] to further
racial .... discrimination [.]" 35
Since the plaintiffs in Bolden did not show that the at-large system
had been adopted with a discriminatory intent, Stewart saw no
vote dilution in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
36
Although it was only a plurality opinion, the decision in
Bolden had a detrimental effect on voting rights litigation.
Bolden also received a great deal of criticism from both legal and
civil rights communities. In turn, civil rights advocates lobbied
Congress to amend section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to repair
the harm inflicted on the voting rights movement by Bolden. 8
C. Congressional Response to Bolden: The 1982 Amendment
Prior to the 1982 amendment, claims that vote dilution vio-
lated voting rights relied on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 39 Bolden suggested that discriminatory intent
would be necessary to find a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In response to Bolden, Congress provided a statutory basis
that did not require a showing of discriminatory intent in order
to claim vote dilution.4 ° The 1982 amendments created, in
effect, a "statutory bypass" around the Bolden decision.4
The Senate Report42 accompanying the 1982 amendment
35. Id. at 66 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 70.
37. See GROFhAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 37.
38. See Davidson, supra note 12, at 38-40; GROFtMAN ET AL., supra note 24,
at 38.
39. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Simmer V.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
40. In addition, Samuel Issacharoff believes that the 1982 amendment's
recognition of racially polarized voting patterns (as the second factor listed by
the Senate Report for consideration in vote dilution claims) had two major
accomplishments:
First, it began to give an operational meaning to vote dilution claims
.... Second. the new statutory standard provided federal courts with
a mechanism to inquire openly into the outcomes of actual voting
practices while circumventing . . . the "brooding omnipresence" of
proportional representation.
Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 1849. Cf discussion supra note 24 (Issacharoff's
criticism of the shortcomings existing in the White/Zimmer analysis).
41. GRorhAt ET AL., supra note 24, at 38.
42. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177 [hereinafter Senate Report].
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explained that section 2 "protects the right of minority voters to
be free from election practices, procedures or methods that deny
them the same opportunity to participate in the political process
as other citizens enjoy." 3 In view of this purpose, the Report
concluded that the "intent test . . . places an unacceptably diffi-
cult burden on plaintiffs."44 The Report added that "the Com-
mittee has amended Section 2 to permit plaintiffs to prove
violations by showing that minority voters were denied an equal
chance to participate in the political process, i.e., by meeting the
pre-Bolden results test."45 It listed a number of typical factors
which might be considered by courts assessing violations under
the amendment's result-based test.46 This list replicates the fac-
tors considered in Zimmer.47
43. Id. at 206.
44. Id. at 194.
45. Id. at 193.
46. Senate Report, supra note 42, at 206-07, noted seven typical factors and
two additional factors which may show a violation of section 2:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state
or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt
or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as
part of plaintiffs evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice or procedure is tenuous.
47. See supra text accompanying note 24.
19941
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D. Thornburg v. Gingles
With its decision in Thornburg, the Supreme Court
attempted to define the standard for establishing a voting rights
violation under the amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Rather than restate the statutory standard described in the Sen-
ate Report, the Court set forth a three-part test which focused on
a racially-polarized voting inquiry.48 First, the plaintiff must show
that the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district."4 9
Second, the plaintiff must show that the minority group is "politi-
cally cohesive."5" Third, the plaintiff must show that the majority
group votes as a bloc allowing the majority group "usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.""1
Influenced by the Senate Report which emphasized a "func-
tional" approach to redress inequality, Justice Brennan, who
wrote the majority opinion,52 believed that the degree to which
minority groups members have been elected and the extent of
racially polarized voting were "the most important Senate Report
factors bearing on § 2 challenges to multimember districts." "
This racially-polarized voting inquiry became the primary mea-
sure of vote dilution,54 fundamental to meeting the second and
third parts of the test. According to Justice Brennan, "[t]he pur-
48. Circuit courts disagree as to whether the three-part Gingles test is
sufficient by itself or necessary but insufficient by itself to prove a violation of
section 2. See generally GROFNIAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 54-60. In addition, the
extent to which Gingles is limited to cases involving vote dilution and voting
rights has not been resolved. See generally Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up":
Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 449 (1988). However, neither concern substantially affects the analysis or
argument considered in this note.
49. 478 U.S. at 50.
50. Id. at 51.
51. Id.
52. Gingles produced four separate opinions. Justice Brennan wrote the
five-part majority opinion (I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V). Justice Brennan was
joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and White.
However, Justice White did not join Part 11-C of Brennan's opinion, and
explained his disagreement with Part III-C in a short concurring opinion.
Justice O'Connor also wrote an opinion concurring only in the judgment
and disagreeing almost entirely with the majority opinion's reasoning. Justice
O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist.
Finally, Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall.
For the purposes of this article, only the opinions by Justices Brennan,
O'Connor, and White will be discussed.
53. 478 U.S. at 48 n.15.
54. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 24.
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pose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is
twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute
a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote
sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidates."55 As the district court in McNeil v. City of Springield56
explained:
Without establishing the first condition, the minority
group cannot show that it has even the potential to elect
the candidate of its choice in the absence of the alleged
discriminatory practice. The final two requirements com-
prise the foundation for a finding that racial vote polariza-
tion exists. Establishment of these two conditions
demonstrated that the black minority usually votes for one
candidate, and the white majority votes for and elects a dif-
ferent candidate. If this racial vote polarization exists, then
the minority voters have shown that "submergence in a
white multi-member district impedes its ability to elect its
chosen representatives.
In Gingles, Justice Brennan attempted to construct, in pragmatic
fashion, a methodical test from the Senate Report factors.
II. SPLIT OVER THE MINORITY-PREFERRED CANDIDATE
The third part of the Gingles test requires a section 2 plaintiff
to show that the majority group votes as a bloc allowing the
majority group "usually to defeat the minority's preferred candi-
55. 478 U.S. at 56. Bernard Grofman observes that in Gingles "[t] he Court
also accepted the distinction between the existence of racial polarization per se
and the nature of that polarization being of practical or legal significance." As
a result, Grofman states:
In [Gingles] the inquiry into polarization was thus effectively
bifurcated. The first part was the judgment of whether polarization
existed. The second part was whether it was legally significant.
Moreover, this second inquiry was itself bifurcated. It required two
"discrete inquiries," the first into minority voting practices, the second
into white voting practices.
Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case
Law, in CONTROVrERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 197, 211 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Daidson eds., 1992). The inquiry into minority voting practices cor-
responds to determining whether the minority group is politically cohesive.
The inquiry into white voting practices corresponds to determining whether
the majority group votes as a bloc as to usually defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.
56. 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re City
of Springfield, 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987).
57. 658 F. Supp. at 1019 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
19941
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date."58 The absence of a single definition for the minority-pre-
ferred candidate presents a simple problem: which elections may
be examined to show a violation of section 2? Because part three
of the Gingles test requires the plaintiff to show that the majority
group votes as a bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate,
the appropriate elections to examine are elections where a
minority-preferred candidate exists."9 But where does a minor-
ity-preferred candidate exist; that is, who is qualified to be a
minority-preferred candidate?
As explained, the minority-preferred candidate must be
identified in order to satisfy this part of the test. The Gingles
Court failed to agree upon a definition of the minority-preferred
candidate, and the circuit courts have drawn independent and
contradictory conclusions.6 ° In particular, many courts differ
over whether the race of the candidate is relevant to finding a
minority-preferred candidate.
58. 478 U.S. at 51.
59. Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Tenn. 1988),
provides an example of how different conclusions may be reached because
different elections were used in collecting statistical evidence.
Dr. James Loewen, the expert witness for the plaintiffs, analyzed five
elections between 1967 and 1983 that involved black and white candidates for
City Commissioner of Jackson. Based upon these five elections, Dr. Loewen
concluded that black voters had been unable to elect their preferred candidate.
Id. at 1528-29.
However, Dr. Charles Bullock, the expert witness for the defendants,
analyzed fourteen elections between 1967 and 1983. Besides elections that
involved black and white candidates, the defendants also included elections
that involved only white candidates. Dr. Bullock concluded that black voters
had been able to elect their preferred candidate in seven of the fourteen
elections. Id. at 1529.
The court noted:
The reason for the different conclusions reached by the experts is that
Dr. Loewen considered only elections in which a black candidate
opposed a white candidate while Dr. Bullock considered all contested
elections, including elections in which there was no black candidate.
Consequently, plaintiffs contend that the court should consider only
elections in which black candidates opposed white candidates as being
probative on the issue of the ability of blacks to elect candidates of
their choice, while defendants contend that the court must consider
all elections.
Id. at 1529. The court held that, while it may consider all elections, it does not
need to give equal weight to those elections in reaching its decision. Id. at
1529. After considering the circumstances surrounding the elections, the court
concluded that blacks had less opportunity than white voters to elect represent-
atives of their choice. Id. at 1531.
60. See infra part II.D.
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A. Justice Brennan: Candidate's Race as Irrelevant
Justice Brennan argued that the race of the minority-pre-
ferred candidate was irrelevant to the Gingles analysis. Brennan
firmly held the belief that a mere correlation between the voting
minority group and a candidate defeated by a majority bloc satis-
fied part three of the Gingles test. For Brennan, this application
of section 2 was consistent with its statutory language and pre-
vented the re-emergence of the intent-based test rejected by the
Senate Report in response to Bolden.
In Part III-C of Gingles, a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan
wrote that "both the language of § 2 and a functional under-
standing of the phenomenon of Vote dilution mandate the con-
clusion that the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to the
racial bloc voting analysis."61 Brennan noted that "[b]ecause
both minority and majority voters often select members of their
own race as their preferred representatives, it will frequently be
the case that a black candidate is the choice of blacks while a
white candidate is the choice of whites," but he added:
Nonetheless, the fact that race of voter and race of candi-
date is often correlated is not directly pertinent to a § 2
inquiry. Under § 2, it is the status of the candidate as the
chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race
of the candidate that is important.62
Brennan relied on a plain reading of section 2 which uses the
phrase "representatives of their choice" without further
elaboration.6"
In addition, Brennan argued that "only the race of the voter,
and not the race of the candidate, is relevant to racial bloc
voting." "
Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the black commu-
nity is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks pre-
fer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-
member, black majority district. Bloc voting by a white
majority tends to prove that blacks will generally be unable
to elect representative of their choice. 65
61. 478 U.S. at 67. Part III-C obtained only a.plurality. Justice Brennan
was joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice White, who had
joined the others with respect to parts I, II, I1-A, III-B. IV-A, and V, filed a
concurring opinion in which he voiced his disagreement with respect to Part
III-C.
62. Id. at 68 (emphasis in original).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
64. 478 U.S. at 68.
65. Id.
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He rejected the suggestion that "racially polarized voting refers
to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because
they prefer members of their own race or are hostile to blacks, as
opposed to voting patterns where whites vote for white candi-
dates because the white candidates spend more on their cam-
paigns ..... " Brennan responded that
[t]his argument, like the argument that the race of the
voter must be the primary determinant of the voter's bal-
lot, is inconsistent with the purposes of § 2 and would
render meaningless the Senate Report factor that
addresses the impact of low socioeconomic status on a
minority group's level of political participation.
Congress intended the Voting Rights Act eradicate
inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the
vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination.6 7
When Brennan referred to "the argument that the race of the
voter must be the primary determinant," he was discussing the
notion that "voting refers to voting patterns that are in some way
caused by race, rather than to voting patterns that are merely corre-
lated with the race of the voter."68 As Brennan explained in an ear-
lier passage of Part III-C:
Whether appellants and the United States believe that
it is the voter's race or the candidate's race that must be
the primary determinant of the voter's choice in unclear
... In either case, we disagree: For purposes of § 2, the legal
concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation
nor intent.69
Brennan may have feared that allowing courts to consider the
race of the candidate (or even the race of the voters in some
causal sense, beyond mere correlation) would somehow provide
a loophole through which the discriminatory-intent requirement
could return. 70
B. Justice White: Interest Group Politics
Justice White disagreed with Justice Brennan's proposition
that the race of the candidate is irrelevant. White believed that
vote dilution analysis which focused only on the race of the voter
would result in "interest-group politics rather than a rule hedg-
66. Id. at 69.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
70. See Sushma Soni, Note, Defining the Minority-Preferred Candidate Under
Section 2, 99 YALE L.J. 1651, 1665 (1990).
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ing against racial discrimination."7' While Brennan focused on
section 2 as a statutory response to the intent-based test of Bolden,
White emphasized the need to connect racial discrimination to
the challenged practices. According to White, "I doubt that this
is what Congress had in mind in amending § 2 as it did, at it
seems quite at odds with the discussion in Whitcomb v. Chavis."72
To illustrate his point on interest-group politics, White used
a hypothetical eight-member multimember district with a 60%
white and 40% black vote. He reasoned that if eight Republican
candidates, including two blacks, win election, but 80% of the
blacks vote Democratic, a section 2 violation would exist under
Brennan's scheme. White added that a section 2 violation would
also exist if "in a single-member district that is 60% black ...
enough of the blacks vote with the whites to elect a black candi-
date who is not the choice of the majority of black voters. "7
According to White, "[t] his is interest group politics rather than a
rule hedging against racial discrimination."74 Regardless of
whether a minority candidate was elected by the majority, or
what non-racial reasons might exist for a minority-preferred can-
didate's failure to be elected, minority voters were entitled to
win. As White saw it, minority voters were being granted a pre-
ferred status.
Justice White viewed section 2 as a response to racially dis-
criminatory practices, leading him to focus on the voting behav-
ior of majority groups. In the first hypothetical, the white
majority's election of two black candidates would disprove the
presence of racial discrimination.75 In the second hypothetical,
the majority of black voters failed to elect their candidate
71. 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 83 (citing to Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-60
(1971) (contrasting the permissible purpose of constitutional remedies to
protect civil rights with the impermissible purpose of addressing electoral
defeat by a particular interest group)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Lani Guinier discusses the problem surrounding a black candidate
elected by a white majority:
Authentic leaders are those elected by black voters. In voting
rights terminology, electoral ratification from majority-black, single-
member districts establishes authenticity. These facts distinguish the
authentic representatives from those officials who are handpicked by
the "establishment," or who must appeal to white voters in order to get
elected. Establishment-endorsed blacks are unlikely to be authentic
because they are not elected as the representatives of choice of the
black community. In addition, these officials are often marginal
members whose only real connection with black constituents is skin
color.
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because of black cross-over, not racial discrimination by whites.
In essence, White was asking whether white voting behavior sug-
gest racial discrimination resulting in the minority-preferred can-
didate's defeat. White implies that a section 2 violation could
exist only where the minority-preferred candidate is a minority
member.76
White thought Brennan's scheme conferred to minorities a
right to elect its minority-preferred candidate. If the minority-
preferred candidate fails to be elected, regardless of the cause
and however removed from the taint of racial discrimination, a
section 2 violation would exist. 77 As a result, section 2 promotes
interest group politics rather than combats racial discrimination.
C. Justice O'Connor: Candidate's Race as Relevant
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice White. In complete
variance from Justice Brennan, Justice O'Connor believed that a
section 2 defendant should be allowed to show that the majority
bloc voted to defeat a minority-preferred candidate for reasons
other than race.
Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority group
in a particular election was rejected by white voters for rea-
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. Rv. 1077, 1103-04 (1991).
76. This proposition is a simple extension of the hypothetical already
given by Justice White. In his first hypothetical, White would argue that a
section 2 violation does not exist because the white majority voted for and
elected two black candidates. The white voters did not act with racial animus.
Now consider the following hypothetical. A multimember district is 60%
white and 40% black. Five candidates run for office. "A" is white, "B" is white,
"C" is white, "D" is black, and "E" is black. Black voters overwhelmingly support
C, but white voters overwhelmingly support A and B, who are therefore elected.
In this case, Justice White would not find a violation of section 2 since the white
voters did not racially discriminate against the minority-preferred candidate,
i.e., white voters did not decline to vote for C because he is black ... since C is
not black. (Note - Since neither D nor E received a majority of the black vote,
they are not the minority-preferred candidate although both are black.)
Therefore, White's concurring opinion implies that only when the minority-
preferred candidate is a minority member can a violation of section 2 exist.
Only where black voters voted for a black candidate, D or E, but white
candidates were elected could black voters claim racial discrimination.
77. As Sushma Soni notes, "ThusJustice White appears to be concerned
with the prospect that plaintiffs can and will allege section 2 violations
whenever their preferred candidate loses for reasons unconnected with race -
in other words, for reasons such as party affiliation, electoral experience, or
even socioeconomic status." See Soni supra note 70, at 1663. Soni observes that
"Justice White seems to fear thatJustice Brennan's formulation confers a 'right
to win' upon the minority candidate and her constituency, rather than the right
to a 'level political playing ground.'" Id.
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sons other than those which made that candidate the pre-
ferred choice of the minority group would seem clearly
relevant in answering the question whether block voting by
white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates. 7 3
Consider an example where the minority group voted for a can-
didate because the candidate is a member of that minority
group. The candidate's race made him "the preferred choice of
the minority group." However, assume that the majority group
voted as a bloc to defeat this candidate. The majority group may
defend its voting behavior by providing evidence that it voted
against the candidate because of a factor other than the candi-
date's race (e.g., the candidate's position on taxes). 79 In this
way, the race of the candidate may be relevant to prove a viola-
tion of section 2 under O'Connor's scheme. O'Connor con-
cluded by saying, "I agree with Justice W[hite] that Justice
B[rennan's] conclusion that the race of the candidate is always
irrelevant in identifying racially polarized voting conflicts with
Whitcomb ... ."80
In their concurring opinions, Justices White and O'Connor
criticized Justice Brennan's position regarding minority pre-
ferred candidate. Furthermore, they believed that Brennan's dis-
cussion of the minority-preferred candidate's race was not
necessary to the disposition of Gingles. According to White, "on
the facts of this case, there is no need to draw the voter/candi-
date distinction."8' O'Connor agreed, 'Justice B[rennan's] con-
clusion that the race of the candidate is always irrelevant in
identifying racially polarized voting conflicts with Whitcomb and is
not necessary to the disposition of this case."8 2 In Gingles, all the
elections examined involved minority-preferred candidates who
were minority members. Therefore, White and O'Connor
believed that the issue of the minority-preferred candidate's race
78. 478 U.S. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79. Justice Brennan may have feared that this argument too closely
approached a requirement that plaintiffs show discriminatory intent. Indeed,
plaintiffs would be required to show that the majority voted against the
candidate because of the candidate's race, and not other political factors. See
note 70 and accompanying text.
As amended, section 2 no longer requires plaintiffs show discriminatory
intent. However, Justice O'Connor suggested that defendants can avoid
violating section 2 by showing that reasons beside race resulted in the defeat of
the minority-preferred candidate. Her argument seems to retain an intent-
based test, but shifts the burden of proof: from plaintiffs having to prove
discriminatory intent to defendants having to disprove such intent.
80. 478 U.S. at 101 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 101 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
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need not be addressed. But, the disarray in the circuit courts
demonstrates that the issue did need to be addressed as a precur-
sor to consistent application of Gingles.
D. Circuit Courts Divided
While the Tenth Circuit has adoptedjustice Brennan's posi-
tion and considered elections where no minority candidate ran
for office, 3 the Fifth Circuit has taken the contrary position and
stated that "implicit in the Gingles holding is the notion that
black preference is determined from elections which offer the
choice of a black candidate." 4 Between these extremes, the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have not clearly decided whether
the candidate's race is relevant.85 The Supreme Court's failure
to decide this question in Gingles has yielded a split in the circuit
courts.8 6
1. Race Not Determinative
The Tenth Circuit has considered whether a candidate who
is not a member of a particular minority group may be consid-
ered the minority-preferred candidate for that group. In Sanchez
v. Bond,87 the appellate court affirmed the district court's finding
that the at-large electoral process used by Saguache County, Col-
orado,, to elect county commissioners did not violate section 2.
According to the district court, Hispanic voters in Saguache
County failed to show that the at-large electoral practice pre-
vented them from electing a candidate of their choice. To make
this finding, the district court considered "the election of three
Anglo Democrats to the county commission as evidence of the
Hispanics' ability to elect candidates of their preference."88
Before making this finding, Hispanic voters questioned whether
"it [was] inappropriate to consider candidates who are not them-
selves minorities in determining whether racial bloc voting exists
and in determining whether the minority group has been able to
elect candidates of their preference."89 The appellate court
deemed this question to be important because it believed that
83. See Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 937 (1990).
84. Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 503 (5th
Cir. 1987).
85. See Collins v. Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989); City of
Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987).
86. See generally GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 76-80.
87. 875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989).
88. Id. at 1494.
89. Id.
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"the success of certain Anglo candidates played a significant part
in the [district] court's finding that vote dilution had not
occurred."9"
The appellate court in Sanchez denied that a minority-pre-
ferred candidate must be a member of that minority group. It
noted that "[t]he Gingles opinion offers little guidance on what
significance the race of the candidates is to be given in assessing
a § 2 claim."9 The court observed that "[n]othing in [section 2]
indicates that the chosen representative of a minority group must
be a minority."92 It reasoned that section 2 "requires that the
district court make a determination from the totality of the cir-
cumstances, not from a selected set of circumstances. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that there is no rule of law prohibiting the
district court from examining those elections having only Anglo
candidates."93 The appellate court recognized that the district
court could find under section 2 that a candidate who was not a
member of a minority group was the minority-preferred candi-
date of that group.
The Tenth Circuit's position parallels that of Justice Bren-
nan in Gingles. The statutory language does not require the
minority-preferred candidate to be a minority member, and the
appellate court accepted the district court's reliance on the
"totality of the circumstances" to guide its decision in what elec-
tions to examine.
2. Race Determinative
The Fifth Circuit has also considered whether a candidate
who is not a member of a particular minority group may be con-
sidered the minority-preferred candidate for that group. In Citi-
zens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna,94 black voters challenged
the city's at-large alderman elections. The appellate court in
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1495. The Sanchez court said:
We do not believe that a per se rule against examining races that
have only white candidates is implicit in Gingles. Such a rule would be
clearly contrary to the plurality opinion, which views the race of the
candidates as irrelevant in voting analysis. Moreover, such a rule is
questionable in light of the language of § 2, which seeks to give
minorities equal opportunity to "elect representatives of their choice."
Nothing in the statue indicates that the chosen representative of a
minority group must be a minority.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 1495.
94. 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 849 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989).
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Gretna affirmed the district court's finding that the at-large elec-
tions violated section 2. As part of its argument, the City of
Gretna claimed that the district court had erred in finding racial
bloc voting because the district court had considered only those
elections involving black candidates.
The Gretna court stated:
Mindful of [the dangers in advancing interest group poli-
tics or enforcing proportional representation], we con-
clude that Gingles is properly interpreted to hold that the
race of the candidate is in general of less significance that
the race of the voter - but only within the context of an elec-
tion that offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority
candidate.9 5
Although the court acknowledged Justice Brennan's emphasis of
the race of the voter over the race of the candidate, it limited the
definition of the minority-preferred candidate. The court
restricted the definition by stating that "implicit in the Gingles
holding is the notion that black preference is determined from
elections which offer the choice of a black candidate."96 In
essence, the Gretna court equated "the context of an election that
offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority candi-
date" with the presence of candidate who is a member of that
minority group.
The Fifth Circuit in Gretna held that the race of the candi-
date was relevant. It based its decision on reasoning somewhat
different from that of either Justices White or O'Connor in Gin-
gles to argue that the minority-preferred should be a minority
member. According to the court, this requirement insures that
the minority-preferred candidate is the minority voter's true
"candidate of choice."
3. Race and Indecision
The Fourth and Eleventh circuits have failed to take decisive
positions on whether the candidate's race is relevant to finding a
minority-preferred candidate. Their opinions fail to provide any
direction, and suggest somewhat contradictory messages.
In a case challenging the at-large elections for city council
members in Norfolk, Virginia, the Fourth Circuit in Collins v. Nor-
folk97 did not reject the idea that a non-minority member could
be the minority-preferred candidate. The appellate court, how-
ever, did find that the district court had erred in considering a
95. 834 F.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 503-04.
97. 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
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successful non-minority candidate to be the minority-preferred
candidate. Although the successful candidate had received over
50% of the minority vote, the Collins court found that he was not
the minority-preferred candidate since other minority candidates
in the same election had received a greater percentage of the
minority vote but were defeated.98 The Fourth Circuit opinion
stated that "support for some successful candidates by a majority
of minority voters in multimember district races does not prove
that the successful candidates were the chosen representatives of
the minority when a candidate who received much greater minority sup-
port was defeated."99 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
with acceptance the Fifth Circuit decision in Gretna.1 °° The Col-
lins court's acceptance of Gretna and rejection of the district
court's notion of a minority-preferred candidate suggest that
only minority candidates can qualify as the minority-preferred
candidate, but its position is not clear.
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has failed to make its position
clear. In City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings,"' the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment that a sin-
gle commissioner form of government for Carroll County, Geor-
gia, did not violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority
voting strength. The Carrollton court deemed the district court's
failure to find racially polarized voting in the county-wide elec-
tions to be "clearly erroneous,"102 and held "that there [was] sub-
stantial evidence in the record to indicate that Carroll County
experience[d] racially polarized voting in county-wide elec-
98. The court considered the following situation:
In 1974 Lenious G. Bond [black] received 73.4% of the black vote;
he was defeated. Elizabeth M. Howell [white] received 58.2% of the
black vote; she was elected. Claude J. Staylor, Jr., [white] received
56.5% of the black vote; he was elected. The district court held that
Howell and Staylor, rather than Bond, were the minority's
representatives of choice. A similar situation arose in the 1980
election. Evelyn T. Butts [black] received 92.9% of the black vote; she
was defeated. Howell [white] received 72.9% of the black vote; she was
elected. The district court held that Howell, rather than Butts, was the
minority's representative of choice.
Id. at 1238.
99. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
100. "Thus it was virtually unavoidable that certain white candidates
would be supported by a large percentage of Gretna's black voters. Significance
lies in the fact that the black candidate preferred by the minority was defeated
by white bloc voting." Id.
101. 829 F.2d 1547 (lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988).
102. 829 F.2d at 1559. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 52; Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)(defining "clearly erroneous" standard of
review).
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tions."103 In reaching this holding, the Carrollton court consid-
ered only elections which involved black candidates.
Nonetheless, the it also stated that "[u]nder Section 2, it is the
status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particu-
lar group, not the race of the candidate that is important."104
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit in Carrollton suggests that the
race of the candidate is not essential in qualifying as the minor-
ity-preferred candidate, but only considered elections which
involved minority candidates.
Since Thornburg v. Gingles was decided, circuit courts have
remain divided over whether a candidate's race is relevant in
finding a minority-preferred candidate. While the Fifth Circuit
has stated that the candidate's race is relevant and the Eleventh
Circuit has stated that the candidate's race is irrelevant, the other
circuits remain undecided. This circuit split is a result of the Gin-
gles Court's failure to resolve the question. Justices Brennan,
White, and O'Connor each offered divergent arguments to sup-
port different positions. With the continuing importance of the
Gingles analysis in multimember and singe-member districts,
these different positions on who may be the minority-preferred
candidate promise to aggravate the circuit split and complicate
voting rights litigation.
III. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act explains that a violation
exists
if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or elec-
tion ... are not equally open to participation by members
of a class of citizens [on account of race or color] ... in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.' 5
From this language and the legislative history, the Supreme
Court constructed the three-part test in Gingles. The Court
announced the three-part test in an attempt to outline a
methodical approach which would guide the circuit courts in
considering claims of section 2 violations in voting rights cases.
Part three of the Gingles test requires that the plaintiff show that
103. 829 F.2d at 1559.
104. Id. at 1557. The Eleventh Circuit did note that only a plurality of the
Gingles Court agreed with this position espoused byjustice Brennan. Id. at 1557
n.12.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
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the majority group votes as a bloc allowing it to defeat the minor-
ity-preferred candidate. Unfortunately, the Court did not
explain how to identify the minority-preferred candidate. The
legislative history surrounding the 1982 amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act provides a possible solution to this unanswered
question.
A. Expanding on the Tenth Circuit
Simplified, the question is whether a person who is not a
member of a particular minority group may be considered the
minority-preferred candidate for that group. The statutory Ian
guage and the legislative history include no such restriction. The
statute refers only to "representatives of choice." In holding that
the minority-preferred candidate must be a member of the
minority group, the Fifth Circuit understands "choice" to exist
only where a member of that minority group is a candidate. The
Fifth Circuit has (arbitrarily) established the presence of a
minority candidate as a threshold requirement for the ability to
choose. In addition, the positions taken by Justices White and
O'Connor threaten to return section 2, analysis back to the
intent-based test that was expressly rejected by Congress in 1982.
Rather than accept the pronouncement of the Fifth Circuit,
this Note argues that the Tenth Circuit correctly stated that
"[n]othing in [section 2] indicates that the chosen representative
of a minority group must be a minority."1 ' The Senate Report
accompanying the 1982 amendments and the amended section 2
itself, consistent with the Tenth Circuit's statement, do not indi-
cate that a minority-preferred candidate must be a member of
the minority group. According to the Senate Report 0 7 and Jus-
tice Brennan,"0 ' section 2 focuses on the minority voter, not the
candidate.
106. 875 F.2d at 1495.
107. "Section 2 protects the right of minority voters to be free from
election practices, procedures or methods, that deny them the same
opportunity to participate in the political process as other citizens enjoy."
Senate Report, supra note 42, at 206 (emphasis added).
The Senate Report recognizes that the section 2 plaintiff is the minority
voter, not the candidate. "If as a result of the challenged practice or structure
plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice, there is a violation of this section."
Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
108. In Gingles, Justice Brennan also wrote:
Both § 2 itself and the Senate Report make clear that the critical
question in a § 2 claim is whether the use of a contested electoral
practice or structure results in members of a protected group having
19941
654 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8
Although the Tenth Circuit in Sanchez correctly held that a
candidate who is not a member of a particular minority group
may be considered the minority-preferred candidate for that
group, it nonetheless failed to provide any meaningful guidance
in identifying the minority-preferred candidate. The court
merely offered the broad instruction that section 2 "requires that
the district court make a determination from the totality of the
circumstances."' 0 9
The factors listed in the Senate Report provide the guidance
that is missing in the Tenth Circuit's position. The factors that
.the Senate Report lists (as typical) are: (1) whether there exists a
history of official discrimination affecting the ability of the
minority to participate politically; (2) whether voting is racially
polarized; (3) whether electoral practices that allow discrimina-
tion have been used; (4) whether the minority has access to the
candidate slating processes (if one is present); (5) whether the
minority has suffered discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health which hinder the ability of the minority
to participate politically; (6) whether political campaigns have
used racial appeals; and (7) whether members of the minority
group have been elected to office." 0 As "additional factors that
in some cases have had probative value," the Senate Report adds:
(8) whether elected officials have been unresponsive to the
needs of the minority and (9) whether the policy underlying the
use of the questioned electoral practice is tenuous."' Without
either inventing a method for determining the minority-pre-
ferred candidate that lacks any judicial as well as statutory basis"12
or accepting a method that sacrifices statutory language by con-
sidering the race of the candidate,' the factors in the legislative
history may be used -to identify the minority-preferred candidate.
They provide a flexible but non-ambiguous rubric for district
courts.
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
478 U.S. at 63. He also wrote that "[u]nder § 2, it is the status of the candi-
date as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, and not the race of the
candidate, that is important." Id. at 68 (emphasis in original).
109. 875 F.2d at 1495.
110. Senate Report, supra note 46 (reprinting the factors in full).
111. Id.
112. See Evelyn E. Shockley, Note, Voting Rights Act Section 2: Racially
Polarized Voting and the Minority Community's Representative of Choice, 89 MIcH. L.
REv. 1038 (1991).
113. See Soni, supra note 70.
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B. Application of the Senate Report Factors
The factors in the Senate Report can be applied to the situa-
tion surrounding a candidate to determine whether that candi-
date should be considered a minority-preferred candidate.
Consider the following hypothetical example: Plaintiffs who are
black voters in St. Joseph County allege that the electoral proce-
dure used to elect county commissioners violates section 2. The
county offers evidence that, in a recent election, "A" received
73% of the black vote and was elected as a county commissioner.
"A" is white and a Democrat. There were no minority candidates
running in that election. Is "A" the minority-preferred
candidate?
1. "A" Is Not the Minority-Preferred Candidate
In an election without non-white candidates, it is inevitable
that a white candidate will receive a majority of the non-white
vote. The fact that in some situations "it [is] virtually unavoida-
ble that certain white candidate [will] be supported by a large
percentage of... black voters" 14 may have prompted the Fifth
Circuit to conclude that only a minority candidate can qualify as
a minority-preferred candidate. Bernard Grofman has
remarked:
In so holding, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
problem with designating a white candidate as "minority
preferred" - the fear that courts will fail to recognize situa-
tions in which neither candidate was truly a candidate of
choice. For instance, certain circumstances (such as the
fact that a black has never been elected to office) may dis-
suade minority candidates from running for office. When
no viable minority candidates compete for office, should
the fact that blacks vote anyway, and therefore some candi-
date will, simply by default, receive more of the black vote
than any other candidate, automatically render that candi-
date the "minority-preferred" candidate?" 5
In this passage, Grofman has identified the main underlying con-
cern: that in identifying a candidate who is not a member of a
particular minority group to be the minority-preferred candidate
for that group, courts will fail to recognize situations in which an
elected candidate who received a sizable portion of the minority
114. Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 502 (5th
Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 849 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905
(1989).
115. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 76-77.
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vote was not truly a candidate of choice. In the attempt to find
some additional guarantee of genuineness, some courts have
accepted the questionable inference that a candidate's minority
status insures the minority voters' preference. By this reasoning,
"A" cannot be the minority-preferred candidate.
2. "A' May or May Not Be the Minority-Preferred Candidate
The factors listed in the Senate Report provide assurance
that the candidate is really chosen by the minority voters. To be
the minority-preferred candidate requires more than having
obtained a majority of the minority vote. The candidate is
screened by the Senate factors to ask whether the minority voters
identify with the candidate: whether the minority voters really
have had any opportunity to choose candidates and whether the
minority voters have actually chosen this candidate. In the above
hypothetical, the additional fact that minority voters maintain
significant influence in the Democratic Party and therefore have
a substantial say as to who may run on the Democratic ticket gives
"A" credibility as the minority-preferred candidate. This falls
within the fourth factor which asks whether the minority has
access to the candidate-slating process. In fact, the Tenth Circuit
in Sanchez accepted the district court's finding that several Anglo
county commissioners had been the minority-preferred candi-
date for Hispanic voters' 16 where "Hispanics controlled the Dem-
ocratic party . . . [and] had a very strong say as to which
candidates could run on the Democratic ticket."117
The screening begins with a presumption that vote dilution
exists. First, the plaintiffs present their evidence supporting a
vote-dilution claim. With respect to part-three of the Ginges test,
the plaintiffs must show that the majority group votes as a bloc,
and that this bloc voting allows the majority group to defeat a
candidate who the plaintiffs claim is their minority-preferred can-
didate. This is merely an application of the racially-polarized vot-
ing factor. The elections submitted and minority-preferred
candidates claimed by the plaintiffs are presumed to support the
plaintiffs' claim of vote dilution. The Senate factors are then
used either to rebut or support this presumption. In addition,
the plaintiffs' claim that certain elections or candidates should
not be considered may also be evaluated in light of the Senate
factors.
The nine Senate factors provide criteria by which to evaluate
defendants' claims. Where the defendants suggest that other
116. 875 F.2d at 1495.
117. Id. at 1492.
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elections should be considered because a minority-preferred can-
didate was elected, the defendants may show that a candidate
qualified as minority-preferred candidate. This occurred in
Sanchez v. Bond."' In short, the Senate factors provide a means
by which to examine a candidate where his or her status as a
minority-preferred candidate is in dispute.
For example, in cases where plaintiffs claim that certain elec-
tions lacked a minority-preferred candidate, the fact that no
minority member has ever been elected and therefore minority
candidates who would be truly preferred by the minority are dis-
suaded from running for office (as suggested by Grofman) may
be considered using the seventh Senate factor, whether members
of the minority group have been elected to office. It may also
involve the first or fifth factors, "any history of official discrimina-
tion ... that touched the right of the members of the minority
group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the dem-
ocratic process" or "the extent to which member of the minority
group . . . bear the effects of discrimination . . . which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political process,"
either of which may have submerged the minority's presence in
the district. Whether an elected official has been responsive to
the needs of the minority may have probative value in determin-
ing whether he or she was a minority-preferred candidate. Here,
one is asking whether the candidate's actions reflect his or her
being the minority's candidate. This relies on the likely infer-
ence that a minority-preferred candidate will be attentive to the
needs of his or her constituency. Although this method of
screening still relies on judicial discretion and a balancing of cir-
cumstances, the Senate factors provide reasonable guidelines for
the courts.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
Three comments remain to be made about section 2 of the
Voting Rights Acts. First, section 2 is consistent with Madison's
understanding of representative democracy. Second, in the con-
fusion over defining the minority-preferred candidate, there
exists a tension between protecting the right of minority voters to
have an equal voice and limiting the freedom of minority voters
to choose among candidates. Third, holding that the race of a
minority-preferred candidate is relevant contradicts the notion of
intrinsic equality that justifies democratic government.
118. See supra text accompanying 'notes 116-17.
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A. Madison: Pluralist... and Republican?
James Madison set forth his understanding of representative
democracy" 9 in The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51. There exist a
number of inconsistencies in Madison's reasoning, 2 ' but his
ideas have become so ingrained in the American psyche that they
cannot be ignored. 12  In an effort to avoid tyranny by the major-
ity, Madison urged that the governmental system adopted in
America embrace a diversity of interests and groups.' 2 This plu-
ralist conception views politics as mediating "the struggle among
self-interested groups for scarce social resources."12 According
to Cass Sunstein, pluralists see the common good as a result of
"uninhibited bargaining among the various participants, so that
numbers and intensities of preferences can be reflected in polit-
119. In The Federalist, Madison actually uses the term "republic," rather
than "democracy," to refer to what we understand to be representative
democracy. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (james Madison).
120. See ROBERT A. DAHI., A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33 (1956).
In a detailed analysis of Madisonian thought, Dahl uncovers a number of logical
inconsistencies. For example, he writes:
[B]ecause majorities are likely to be unstable and transitory in a large
and pluralistic society, they are likely to be politically ineffective; and
herein lies the basic protection against their exploitation of
minorities. This conclusion is of course scarcely compatible with the
preoccupation with majority tyranny that is the hallmark of the
Madisonian style of thought.
Id. at 30. Dahl attributes the "logical and empirical deficiencies of Madison's
own thought" to Madison's "inability to reconcile two different goals," the
"assignment of equal rights" to all adult citizens and the "guarantee the liberty
of certain [privileged] minorities." Id. at 31.
121. Robert Dahl writes:
Today, however, it seems probable that for historically explicable
reasons a number of politically active Americans believe themselves to
be members, at least part of the time, of one or more minorities -
minorities, moreover, whose goals might be threatened if the
prescribed constitutional authority 'of majorities were legally
unlimited. Hence, whatever its defects of logic, definition, and
scientific utility, the Madisonian ideology is likely to remain the most
prevalent and deeply rooted of all the styles of though that might
properly be labeled "American."
Id. at 30-31.
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
123. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 29 (1985); see also JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR
PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 65 (1990) ("However,
each analysis [by Madison and Hamilton] abandons the notion of a single
people with a shared interest and turns instead on factions applying the
calculus of economic self-interest.").
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ical outcomes. The common good amounts to an aggregation of
individual preferences."' 24 Robert Dixon remarks that
[a] primary safeguard against "factionalism," that is, against
the rise of dominant interests "adverse to the rights of
other citizens," is provision of channels for the representa-
tion of the maximum number of interests so that policy
decisions will reflect views and interests of a broad cross-
section of society.
125
Therefore, Dixon believes that "a Madisonian theorist would
tend to view with suspicion a frequent use of 'winner-take-all' sys-
tems such as apportionments into large, multimember districts,
which make it difficult for minority interests, even when relatively
concentrated, to elect representatives."12 6 As a result, a real
threat exists of majority tyranny and disregard for the common
good.
At the same time that Madison embraced pluralism, he con-
tinued to adhere to certain beliefs of classical republicanism.
1 2 7
According to Cass Sunstein:
To the republicans, the prerequisite of sound government
was the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private
interests to the general good. Politics consisted of self-rule
by the people; but it was not a scheme in which people
impressed their private preferences on the government. It
was instead a system in which the selection of preferences
was the object of the governmental process. Preferences
were not to be taken as exogenous, but to be developed
and shaped through politics.1 2
8
Classical republicans view politics as dialogic, and direct political
participation by citizens was essential. "The republican concep-
tion carries with it a particular view of human nature; it assumes
that through discussion people can, in their capacities as citizens,
escape private interests and engage in pursuit of the public
good." 12 9 As a result of this belief in direct (or nearly direct)
participation, many classical republicans held a microcosm view
of representation. According to John Adams, the legislature
124. See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 32-33.
125. ROBERT G. DIXON, REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITCS 41
(1968).
126. Id. at 42.
127. For discussion of simultaneous classical liberal and republican
traditions in American political development, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 3-29 (1993), and MORONE, supra note 123,
at 15-19.
128. See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 31.
129. See id. at 31; see also MORONE, supra note 123, at 41-42.
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"should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large
... it should think, feel, reason and act like them."' 3 ° Madison
rejected this microcosm view of representation, but continued to
believe that representatives should exercise their independent
judgment and act through collective reasoning directed toward
realizing the common good.1 31 In essence, Madison believed
that representatives should advocate the interests of their constit-
uents, yet continue to exercise their independent judgment.
Section 2 attempts to remedy situations of vote dilution that
submerge minority interests. The long tradition of discrimina-
tion against certain minorities has seriously hindered their ability
to participate in the political process. As a result, these minori-
ties have been unable to introduce their interests into the public
forum. Rejecting classical republicanism, Madisonian democracy
relies on the concept of pluralism in order to prevent majority
tyranny and to obtain a common good. Section 2 attempts to
insure that the exclusion of minority interests from politics,
resulting from past and present discrimination, does not con-
tinue and to rectify situations where such exclusion does exist. 13 2
130. See MORONE, supra note 123, at 40 (quoting John Adams).
131. See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 41-42 (citing to THE FEDERALIST No.
10 & 57 (James Madison)); see also MORONE, supra note 123, at 63 (discussing
Madison's notion of "refining the popular appointments by successive
filtrations" to produce "men who possess the most attractive merit" as
representatives).
132. In Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the
Problem of Racial Genymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REv,. 652
(1993), the authors argue that the Voting Rights Act is inconsistent with
Madison's scheme of government when applied to single-member districts. Id.
at 663-71. According to the authors, "Disabling factions, not empowering them,
lay at the heart of Madison's constitutional idea." Id. at 668. Madison
accomplished this in the following way:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, it can be controlled by the
operation of "the republican principle" of voting in the legislative
body, i.e., the majority can vote down the minority.
* * .The development of majority faction can be limited if the
electorate is numerous, extended, and diverse in interests.
Id. (quoting Robert Dahl). The authors further explain:
The single-member district system accepts what might be called the
Madisonian Wager - that the compromise policies that emerge from a
system that rewards the "center" candidates and ignores the fringes
will in the long run be more respectful of the rights and liberties of
the people than will those compromises that emerge from a system in
which faction is allowed its full, vigorous, and in some ways satisfying
play. The Madisonian Wager is, in effect, a form of poker in which
each player must discard his strongest cards - his one-issue preferences
- before starting to bet.
Id. This position fails to recognize the fact that vote-dilution and vote-fragmen-
tation prevent minorities from participating in political decision. Using the
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In turn, section 2 advances the pluralist goals of preventing
majority tyranny133 and obtaining a truly common good.
These pluralist goals do not support the proposition that
only minority representatives can represent minority groups.
Madison rejected the microcosm view which might have sug-
gested that an "exact portrait" include racial qualities. Instead,
he focused on the representation of interests which can exist
regardless of the representative's race.' 34  As a republican,
Madison urged the exercise of individual and collective reason-
ing to further a common good. This belief in reason and com-
mon good deny the idea of entrenched, unbreachable racial
barriers to mutual understanding. Therefore, Madisonian
democracy or pluralism does not insist that the minority-pre-
ferred candidate be a minority member.
B. Confounding the Freedom to Choose
Many commentators have begun to equate the success of
minority candidates with the effectiveness of section 2.135 They
have begun to reform section 2 into an affirmative action stat-
ute. 136 The position that a non-minority cannot be the minority-
preferred candidate limits the full range of voter choice. In
essence, the minority-preferred candidate becomes the minority-
preferred minority candidate.
Criticism of this position exists on two levels. First, the intro-
duction of the candidate's race into the analysis tends to distract
from the true purpose of the inquiry, to protect voter preference.
The full range of minority-voter choice is restricted to minority
candidates. A simple question captures the dilemma: should
poker metaphor, minority voters simply have been denied a seat in game. The
Voting Rights Act represents a response to this anti-democratic situation. As
Samuel Issacharoff comments, "It is, in Madison's words, 'a republican remedy
for the diseases most incident to republican government.'" Issacharoff, supra
note 24. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 1871-91.
133. See generally Guinier, supra note 75.
134. Lani Guinier recognizes that "[a]uthentic representatives need not
be black as long as the source of their authority, legitimacy, and power base is
the black community. White candidates elected from majority-black
constituencies may therefore be considered 'black' representatives." See
Guinier, supra note 75, at 1103 n.115.
135. See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and
Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY REPRESENTATION 66
(1992); see also LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, THE AMERICAN KALEIDOSCOPE: RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND THE Civic CULTURE 425-30 (1990).
136. Steele writes: "Racial representation is not the same thing as racial
development, yet affirmative action fosters a confusion of these very different
needs." STEELE, supra note 2, at 116.
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black voters be prevented from claiming a white candidate,
whom the black voters roundly supported, as their minority-pre-
ferred candidate?
Second, the introduction of the candidate's race as a variant
on affirmative action has detrimental long-term consequences.
In his book The Content of Our Character, Shelby Steele identified
what seems to be the inherent problem with this position. He
observed:
But the essential problem with this form of affirmative
action [that makes black the color of preference] is the way
it leaps over the hard business of developing formerly
oppressed people to the point where they can achieve pro-
portionate representation on their own (given equal
opportunity) and goes straight for the proportionate rep-
resentation. This may satisfy some whites of their inno-
cence and some blacks of their power, but it does very little
to truly uplift blacks. 117
The use of section 2 merely to increase minority officeholders
without a concurrent increase in minority participation in polit-
ical affairs is merely a "quick fix," glossing over the deeper
problems of racial inequality."3 8 Section 2 was designed to
remove barriers to minority-voter participation, and the focus of
its continued use should remain on raising the minority voter
from submergence, not differential treatment of the candidates.
C. Intrinsic Equality
The idea of intrinsic equality is a fundamental assumption
justifying democratic government. It states that all persons "are,
or ought to be considered, equal in some important sense, " "'
and it implies that "no one is naturally entitled to subject another
to his or her will or authority."4' As Robert Dahl notes,
[h]istorically, the idea of intrinsic equality gained much of
its strength, particularly in Europe and the English-speak-
ing countries, from the common doctrine of Judaism and
Christianity (shared also by Islam) that we are equally
God's children. Indeed it was exactly on this belief that
137. See STEELE, supra note 2, at 115. Steele also adds: "Another liability
of affirmative action comes from the fact that it indirectly encourages blacks to
exploit their own past victimization as a source of power and privilege .... The
obvious irony here is that we become inadvertently invested in the very
condition we are trying to overcome." Id. at 118.
138. See generally Abrams, supa note 48.
139. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 84-85 (1989).
140. See id. at 85 (defining intrinsic equality in Lockean terms).
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Locke grounded his assertion of the natural equality of all
persons in a state of nature. 141
The idea of intrinsic equality forms the foundation for proclaim-
ing that "all men are created equal," and it. provides basis for
finding racial discrimination to be wrong.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act built upon this idea of
intrinsic equality. But requiring that the minority-preferred can-
didate be a minority member does harm to this very idea. Rather
than tearing down barriers to voting equality, it reifies the ideas
behind racial discrimination. It claims that racial differences go
so deep that they prevent any mutual understanding between or
among racial groups. In essence, it denies the human capacity to
think, feel, and care for another beyond/regardless of racial
lines.
CONCLUSION
The language and legislative history of section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act do not indicate that the minority-preferred candi-
dates should be limited to minority members. Section 2 focuses
on minority voters' rights "to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice," regardless of the
candidate's race. Recognizing that a non-minority candidate
may be minority preferred merely follows the language of section
2.
A number of courts have held that a minority-preferred can-
didate must be a minority member in order to guarantee that the
candidate is truly the minority's chosen representative.1 42 This
unnecessary restriction limits the full range of voter choice. It
creates tension between the purpose and the application of sec-
tion 2, and as a result, section 2 attempts to protect the freedom
of minority voters to have an equal voice while actually limiting
their ability to choose among candidates. Screening the candi-
dates against the Senate Report factors provides the additional
security without placing this unreasonable restriction on minor-
ity voters.
In spirit, section 2 relies on a Madisonian understanding of
representative democracy, an understanding according to which
a multitude of interests prevents oppression by a single majority.
Through use of section 2, minority groups can address the his-
tory of discrimination and the current electoral practices that
141. See id. at 85-86. For an interpretation of John Locke's significant
contribution to American political development, see Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
142. See supra part II.B.2.
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have prevented their full political participation. But Madis-
onian democracy does not require that the minority-preferred
candidate be a minority member. In fact, such a requirement
shackles minority voters and contradicts the idea of intrinsic
equality that justifies democracy.
